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Con1licting Perfected Security Interests in Proceeds 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(Code)1 a financer had difficulty establishing a continuing lien on 
a constantly changing collateral such as inventory. Courts would 
often vitiate the secured transaction if the debtor was in possession 
and control of the secured property2 or would considerably weak.en 
the security device by refusing to enforce after-acquired property 
clauses.3 Field warehousing avoided most of the legal problems of 
inventory financing but was too cumbersome and costly for most 
financers.4 The Uniform Trust Receipts Act5 was the first legislative 
attempt to deal with inventory financing, but its provisions were 
complex and difficult to apply.6 
Today, article 9 of the Code has facilitated inventory :financing 
by enabling the debtor to carry on his business of selling goods while 
still protecting the secured party's interest in the inventory. Article 
9 provides that the security interest can shift from the stock which 
the debtor sells to the new inventory that he acquires, thus allowing 
those who buy from the inventory to take free of the security inter-
est. 7 Moreover, the debtor can maintain control over the secured 
property,8 and can give present security in future acquisitions of 
new inventory9 or the proceeds of the inventory.1° Finally, the se-
cured party can acquire a lien which "floats" from the original in-
ventory to other after-acquired inventory.11 
Section 9-306 gives the inventory financer a "continuously per-
fected" security interest in the proceeds of the inventory if the 
security interest in the original collateral was perfected. "Proceeds" 
is defined as including "whatever is received when collateral or 
proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of."12 
1. The Code is hereinafter cited as U.C.C. Citations are to the 1962 Official Text. 
2. E.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
3. E.g., Callahan v. Auburn Prod. Credit Ass'n, 240 Ala. 104, 197 S. 347 (1940). 
4. See, e.g., In re United Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1960); Ribaudu v. 
Citizens Nat'! Bank, 261 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958). 
5. 9c UNIFORM LAws ANN. 231 (1957). 
6. E. FARNSWORTH&: J. HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW 764 (1965). 
7. u.c.c. § 9-307. 
8. u.c.c. § 9-205. 
9. U.C.C. §§ 9-204(3), -108 (stating that a security interest in certain after-acquired 
property is deemed to have been given for present consideration rather than for an 
antecedent debt). 
10. It will be assumed, unless otherwise stated, that proceeds means identifiable 
proceeds. If proceeds is not identifiable, then under U.C.C. § 9-306(2), there can be no 
claim to it. 
ll. See, e.g., Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among 
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien,'' 72 HARv. L. R.Ev. 838, 839 (1959); Gordon, 
The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
and the Preference Problem, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 49 (1962). 
12. u.c.c. § 9-306(1). 
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Thus, the inventory financer may have a security interest in the pro-
ceeds of the original collateral or the proceeds of the proceeds. The 
security interest in the proceeds may be perfected13 in either of two 
ways: (1) under section 9-306(3)(a) the security interest is perfected 
by filing a financing statement that expressly covers both the origi-
nal collateral and the proceeds; (2) under section 9-306(3)(b) the 
security interest in proceeds is perfected by filing a new financing 
statement within ten days after the debtor has received the proceeds. 
The ease of perfecting a security interest in proceeds, however, 
increases the possibility of conflicting security interests in collateral 
in a number of situations in which at least one of the secured parties 
claims the collateral as proceeds. For example, the inventory financer 
may have an interest in proceeds consisting of documents,14 instru-
ments, 15 or chattel paper16 which conflicts with a claim by one who 
has purchased17 the paper or documents. Second, there may be two 
inventory financers claiming the proceeds.18 Third, the proceeds 
may be in the form of accounts,19 in which case both an inventory 
financer and an accounts financer could have a claim. It is the pur-
pose of this Comment to discuss the problems created by these con-
flicts, to evaluate the solutions offered by the Code, and to recom-
mend appropriate alterations where the Code scheme is inadequate. 
13. u.c.c. § 9-303(1): 
A security interest is perfected when it has attached [Section 9-2041 and when 
all the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps arc 
specified in Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305 and 9-306. If such steps are taken before 
the security interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches. 
14. Under U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(e) "document" means "document of title." U.C.C. 
§ 1-201 (15) defines the latter term as follows: 
"Document of title" includes bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, ware-
house receipt or order for the delivery of goods, and also any other document 
which in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately 
evidencing that the person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and 
dispose of the document and the goods it covers. To be a document of title a 
document must purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and purport 
to cover goods in the bailee's possession which are either identified or arc 
fungible portions of an identified mass. 
15. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(g): 
"Instrument" means a negotiable instrument (defined in Section 3-104), or a 
security (defined in Section 8-102) or any other writing which evidences a right 
to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is 
of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any 
necessary indorsement or assignment. 
16. Under U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(b): 
"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary 
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods. When a trans· 
action is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instru-
ment or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes 
chattel paper. 
17. See note 36 injrq and acc;ompanying text. 
18. If the two inventory financers are financing different inventory, there will be 
no conflict, since the proceeds will arise from the disposition of particular inventory, 
and the financer of that particular inventory will prevail. 
19. Under U.C.C. § 9-106 "account" means "any right to payment for goods sold 
or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel 
paper." 
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I. THE GENERAL RULES OF PRIORITY 
Section 9-312(5) establishes a general framework to govern prior-
ities among secured parties with perfected security interests in the 
same collateral. It provides first that when both secured parties have 
perfected by filing, the first to have filed prevails.20 To illustrate, 
assume that an inventory financer, A, files a financing statement 
covering a debtor's inventory, but does not advance the debtor any 
money. A second inventory financer, B, later loans the same debtor 
a sum of money, takes as collateral an interest in the same inventory, 
and files a financing statement. If A subsequently advances the 
debtor money under their agreement, A's security interest then 
becomes perfected.21 Since A and B have perfected by filing, A, 
having filed first, would prevail, not withstanding his later perfec-
tion. 
The second general rule of priority provides that when one of 
the secured parties has perfected othenvise than by filing, the first to 
have perfected prevails.22 Using the hypothetical discussed above, 
assume that B, instead of filing a financing statement, had perfected 
by taking possession of the collateral.23 B would then prevail be-
cause, although A had filed first, A's interest did not become per-
fected until he advanced the money,24 which was after B had per-
fected by taking possession. 
The third rule, which is most relevant to the concept of a con-
tinuously perfected security interest, is contained in section 9-312(6): 
For the purpose of the priority rules of the immediately preceding 
subsection [containing the first and second rules], a continuously 
perfected security interest shall be treated at all times as if perfected 
by filing if it was originally so perfected and it shall be treated at all 
times as if perfected otherwise than by filing if it was originally per-
fected otherwise than by filing. 
For example, assume that an inventory financer, A, files a financing 
statement covering a debtor's inventory, but does not advance the 
debtor any money. A second inventory financer, B, perfects by tak-
ing possession of warehouse receipts covering the inventory.25 A 
then loans the debtor money under their agreement, and B returns 
the receipts to the debtor. Under section 9-304(5), B's security inter-
est remains perfected for twenty-one days after he surrenders posses-
sion of the receipts to the debtor. If B files a financing statement 
20. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). 
21. Under U.C.C. § 9-204(1) a security interest cannot attach, and therefore cannot 
perfect, until value is given. 
22. u.c.c. § 9-312(5)(b). 
23. Perfection is possible by taking possession under U.C.C. § 9-305. 
24. See note 21 supra. 
25. Perfection of a security interest in warehouse receipts by taking possession is 
permissible under U.C.C. § 9-305. 
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within the twenty-one day period, he would prevail over A, since 
under section 9-312(6) B had perfected otherwise than by filing 
and before A, even though A had been the first to file. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF A "CONTINUOUSLY PERFECTED" 
SECURITY INTEREST 
Section 9-306(3) states that "[t]he security interest in proceeds 
is a continuously perfected security interest if the interest in the 
original collateral was perfected . . . ." When confronted with a 
priority problem, it is important to determine whether the per-
fection is an original perfection or a continuation of an already 
existing perfection. If an inventory financer has a perfected security 
interest in the inventory of the debtor but has not filed a financing 
statement covering the proceeds, section 9-306(3) allows him ten 
days after receipt of the proceeds to perfect his interest in the pro-
ceeds. However, a question arises as to the nature of the perfection 
in proceeds during the ten-day period26-that is, whether the inter-
est should be considered as perfected by filing or perfected otherwise 
than by filing. In his Practice Commentary to the New York Uni-
form Commercial Code, Homer Kripke admits that there is such 
a thing as continuity of perfection, but argues that the priority of 
the secured party as to inventory does not continue as to the pro-
ceeds of the inventory when sold.27 The premise of this argument 
seems to be that proceeds is "different collateral," and that since 
the perfection in proceeds is "automatic," it is therefore perfection 
otherwise than by filing.28 In a contest between an inventory financer 
claiming proceeds perfected "automatically" within the ten-day 
period and another secured party who has perfected by filing, 
Kripke would argue that priority should be given to the first to 
perfect.29 Kripke would argue further that even though the "auto-
matically perfected" security interest in proceeds is subsequently 
perfected by filing, under section 9-312(6) the security interest in 
proceeds is always to be considered as having been perfected other-
wise than by filing.30 However, by emphasizing that the collateral 
has taken a different form when it becomes proceeds, Kripke's anal-
ysis ignores the principle underlying the concept of continuity of 
perfection: the automatic perfection that takes place when the 
inventory becomes proceeds is not an initiation of a perfection; 
rather, it is a continuation of an already existing perfection. Thus, 
as will be demonstrated, Kripke's analysis seems to be refuted by 
26. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) gives the secured party ten days to perfect his security 
interest in proceeds. 
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both the provisions of the Code and the underlying principles of a 
floating lien enunciated by the Code. 
Section 9-302(2) explains that as long as there is no period when 
the security interest is unperfected, the interest "shall be deemed 
to be perfected continuously." Section 9-312(6), discussed above,31 
states that such a continuously perfected security interest shall be 
treated as having been perfected in the same manner as that in 
which perfection originally occurred. Therefore, since a security 
interest in proceeds is treated as a continuously perfected security 
interest,32 it is the perfection of the original collateral which should 
be the determining factor in deciding what priority rule governs 
with respect to proceeds. Thus, if an inventory financer has origi-
nally perfected an interest in inventory by filing, the interest in 
proceeds perfected within the ten-day grace period should also be 
deemed perfected by filing. On the other hand, if the interest in 
the original collateral was perfected otherwise than by filing, the 
interest in proceeds should be treated as perfected otherwise than 
by filing.33 
Section 9-402(2)(b) also suggests that a security interest in pro-
ceeds should be considered to be perfected in the same manner as 
the perfection of the security interest in the original collateral. This 
section allows the secured party to continue the perfection in pro-
ceeds beyond the ten-day grace period by filing a financing state-
ment covering proceeds which is signed only by the secured party 
and describes only the original collateral. If the drafters of the Code 
considered the filing of such a statement to be an initiation of a 
new perfection, the financing statement would have to be signed 
by both the secured party and the debtor, and it would also have 
to describe the new collateral.34 
Finally, the very concept of a floating lien suggests that the 
original lien continues, even though the collateral changes form. 
The process of holding an inventory of goods for sale involves a 
continuous transformation of inventory into proceeds and then 
proceeds back into inventory. Yet, even though the collateral 
changes in form, a filing statement covering all the inventory of a 
named debtor located at a specific address would describe the 
collateral sufficiently to maintain perfection and to put any subse-
quent financer on notice. The Code has tried to simplify and en-
31. See text following note 24 supra. 
32. u.c.c. § 9-306 (3). 
33, It is interesting to note that Kripke, while willing to apply U.C.C. § 9-312(6) 
to say that the automatic perfection as to proceeds is controlling even though subse-
quently filed, will not apply that section to say that the perfection of the interest in 
proceeds is controlled by the type of perfection of the original collateral. See N.Y. 
U.C.C. § 9-312 (Practice Commentary 7) (McKinney 1964); te.xt accompanying note 
30 supra. 
34. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1). 
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courage inventory financing by allowing the secured party to follow 
the inventory as it changes into proceeds by giving the secured party 
a "continuously perfected security interest" in proceeds. If the 
secured party were required to file a new agreement every time the 
collateral changed form, the purpose of a floating lien would be 
defeated. Not only would new agreements have to be filed at fre-
quent intervals, but the secured party would continually have to 
police the debtor to discover any possible changes in the collateral. 
Thus, to consider the perfection of the security interest in proceeds 
of the original collateral as a new perfection in different collateral 
is contrary to the underlying scheme which the Code intended to 
effectuate. 
Once the concept of continuity of perfection is understood, it 
becomes clear why the Code looks to the perfection of the original 
collateral to determine priority, and why it does not require a financ-
ing statement which covers only proceeds either to be signed by the 
debtor or to describe the proceeds. Continued perfection of a secu-
rity interest would be pointless if it did not bring with it continued 
priority, since a creditor only perfects in order to gain a priority; 
thus, for perfection to be continued, in any meaningful sense, it is 
obvious that the initial priority must also be continued. 
Having reached this understanding of the concept of a "con-
tinuously perfected security interest," many of the complex priority 
problems will become easier to solve. 
III. CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS IN PROCEEDS 
A. Chattel Paper, Instruments) and Documents 
Frequently, the proceeds claimed by an inventory financer will 
take the form of chattel paper. Chattel paper is a general term 
signifying a ·writing evidencing both a monetary obligation and a 
security interest.35 When the debtor receives chattel paper in return 
for a sale, a conflict may arise between the inventory financer of the 
debtor who will claim the chattel paper as proceeds and a subse-
quent purchaser of the chattel paper. The Code defines a purchaser 
as any one who takes by "sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, 
pledge, lien, issu~ or re-issue, gift, or any other voluntary transac-
tion creating an interest in property."36 The purchaser may have 
perfected either by filing as to all the debtor's existing and after-
acquired chattel paper37 or by taking possession of the paper.38 
35. See note 16 supra. 
36. u.c.c. § 1-201(32), -201(33). 
37. U.C.C. § 9-304(1) permits perfection of a security interest in chattel paper by 
filing. 
38. U.C.C. § 9-305 permits perfection of a security interest in chattel paper by 
taking possession of the paper. 
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Section 9-308 of the Code attempts to resolve the possible conflict 
between an inventory financer and a purchaser who perfects by 
taking possession of the chattel paper.39 This section is designed to 
cover two specific situations: (1) the conflict between a purchaser 
and an inventory financer who claims the chattel paper "merely as 
proceeds"; (2) the conflict between a purchaser and a secured party 
who has a direct interest in the chattel paper. The purchaser who 
takes possession of the chattel paper is always given a priority over 
the inventory financer claiming the chattel paper "merely as pro-
ceeds," even when he takes with knowledge of the inventory financ-
er's security interest. Yet the inventory financer is not injured be-
cause the purchaser of the chattel paper must have given new value, 
thereby providing assets that the inventory financer can reach 
through section 9-306 as proceeds of proceeds. The inventory fi-
nancer, however, may have difficulty identifying the proceeds real-
ized from the disposition of the paper; thus, he would be advised 
to take possession either of the paper, which would prevent section 
9-308 from applying altogether, or the proceeds of the paper in 
order to insure that funds will be available for payment of the debt. 
The inventory financer's claim to the chattel paper appears to 
remain "merely as proceeds" until he refinances the debtor and 
takes a security interest directly in the chattel paper.40 If the inven-
tory financer has so refinanced, he retains priority over a subsequent 
purchaser of the chattel paper, unless that purchaser has met the 
added requirement of section 9-308-that he take "without knowl-
edge that the specific paper ... is subject to a security interest." 
Since knowledge as used in the Code means actual knowledge,41 
the purchaser would not be presumed to have discovered any possi-
ble conflicting security interest. Presumably, then, if the purchaser 
knows only that an inventory financer has a claim to the paper 
"merely as proceeds," and is unaware of a new and direct interest 
acquired by refinancing, he would meet the requirement of section 
9-308 that he take without knowledge.42 
A purchaser of chattel paper may perfect his security interest by 
filing rather than by taking possession, in which case he is not pro-
tected by the special priority rule in section 9-308 and must resort 
39. u.c.c. § 9-308: 
A purchaser of chattel paper or a non-negotiable instrument who gives new value 
and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business and without 
knowledge that the specific paper or instrument is subject to a security interest 
has priority over a security interest which is perfected under Section 9·304 
(permissive filing and temporary perfection). A purchaser of chattel paper who 
gives new value and takes possession of it m the ordinary course of his business 
has priority over a security interest in chattel paper which is claimed merely as 
proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest (Section 9-306), even though 
he knows that the specific paper is subject to the security interest. 
40. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 730-31 (1965). 
41, u.c.c. § 1-201(25). 
42. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 40, at 730-31. 
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to the general priority rules of section 9-312(5). Under this provi-
sion, if both the inventory :financer and the purchaser of the chattel 
paper perfect by filing, the first to file takes priority; on the other 
hand, if the inventory :financer perfects his security interest in the 
original collateral otherwise than by filing, the first to perfect pre-
vails. 
The proceeds claimed by the inventory :financer may also consist 
of non-negotiable instruments;43 for example, the debtor may sell 
goods in exchange for a ninety-day promissory note. As in the case of 
chattel paper, the Code evidences a policy of protecting one who 
takes possession of a non-negotiable instrument in order to facil-
itate its fl.ow in commerce. Section 9-308, when dealing with the 
conflict between a purchaser and an inventory :financer who claims 
the instrument "merely as proceeds," refers only to purchasers of 
chattel paper.44 However, the language of the same section, when 
concerned with the conflict benveen a purchaser and a secured party 
who has a direct interest in the instrument, refers to purchasers of 
both chattel paper and non-negotiable instruments. Thus, appar-
ently, a purchaser of a non-negotiable instrument who perfects by 
taking possession must meet the requirement of lack of knowledge 
in order to prevail over an inventory financer who claims the instru-
ment as proceeds. This analysis assumes, of course, that if a pur-
chaser without knowledge can take priority over an inventory fi-
nancer with a direct interest in the instrument, then, a fortiori, he 
can prevail over an inventory :financer claiming the non-negotiable 
instrument as proceeds.45 
Although the inventory :financer automatically has a perfected 
security interest in proceeds for ten days following the debtor's re-
ceipt of the proceeds, it has been argued that, when the proceeds 
consist of non-negotiable instruments, the inventory financer must 
take possession of the instruments in order to maintain the perfec-
tion of this security interest.46 This argument is based on section 
9-304(1), which provides that "[a] security interest in instruments 
(other than instruments which constitute part of chattel paper) 
can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession, ex-
cept as provided in subsections (4) and (5) [relating to a twenty-one-
day grace period]." However, since proceeds in the form of a non-
negotiable instrument does not represent new collateral but merely 
a change in form of the original collateral, the inventory financer 
does not take a new perfected interest in the instrument, but rather 
43. The Code defines a non-negotiable instrument by elimination. Therefore, it 
is an instrument which does not meet the requirements of U.C.C. § 3-104. Under 
U.C.C. § 8-105 investment securities are negotiable instruments. 
44. See § 9-308 quoted in note 39 supra. 
45. See U.C.C. § 9-303, Comment 3. 
46. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-306 (Practice Commentary 6) (McKinney 1964). See Coogan, 
supra note 11, at 871. 
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maintains a "continuously" perfected security interest in the instru-
ment as proceeds of the original collateral. Therefore, despite the 
language of section 9-304(1), it seems that the inventory financer 
can continue his perfected interest in the instruments claimed as 
proceeds simply by filing within the ten-day grace period. This argu-
ment applies with even greater force where the inventory financer 
filed originally as to both inventory and proceeds. As the inventory 
is sold in exchange for instruments, the interest of the inventory 
financer would remain perfected so long as his filing continues to be 
valid. I£ the interest in proceeds is to be ttuly continuous, it would 
be incongruous to require any further act on the part of the inven-
tory financer who has originally filed as to proceeds. 
The view that the inventory financer retains a perfected security 
interest in non-negotiable instruments in the form of proceeds with-
out taking possession is further substantiated by the language of 
9-309, which specifically refers to the filing of negotiable instru-
ments and thus indicates that, despite the language of section 
9-304(1), filing must have been contemplated as a method of per-
fection by the drafters of the Code.47 
:Much of the foregoing analysis also applies to proceeds in the 
form of negotiable instruments. Here, however, it is clear that if 
the purchaser can meet the requirements of being a holder in due 
course48 he will be protected under section 9-309 from previous 
security interests even if such an interest was perfected by filing.49 
When proceeds are in the form of negotiable documents rather 
than instruments the problems are less complex.rm Section 9-304(1) 
47. U.C.C. § 9-309 provides in pertinent part that: "Filing under this article does 
not constitute notice of the security interest to such holders or purchasers." 
Such an interpretation of section 9-309 does not give unfair advantage to the 
inventory financer. In the case of a negotiable instrument, if a second party purchases 
the instrument and becomes a holder in due course [see text of § 3-302(1) quoted 
in note 48 infra], he will be protected from previous security interests even if the 
previous security interest was perfected by filing. U.C.C. § 9-309. It is also conceivable 
that in addition to an inventory financer another secured party, such as an accounts 
financer, may be claiming the instrument as proceeds. Since the accounts financer is 
not a holder [U.C.C. § 1·201(20) defines holder as "a person who is in possession of 
a document of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or 
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank.'1, he would not have the 
protection of the special priority rule in section 9-309 for holders in due course, and 
his security interest would again be subject to the general priority rules in section 
9-312 (5). 
48. u.c.c. § 3-302(1): 
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument 
(a) for value; and 
(b) in good faith; and 
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense 
against or claim to it on the part of any person. 
49. U.C.C. § 9-309: "Nothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due 
course of a negotiable instrument • • • .'' 
50. See note 14 supra. There would seem to be no problem presented if proceeds 
consists of non-negotiable documents, since under U.C.C. § 9-304(3) a filing as to 
the goods perfects the security interest in the document. 
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permits a security interest in a negotiable document to be perfected 
by filing. Consequently, the problem of the inventory financer los-
ing his perfection by failing to take possession is eliminated. As in 
the case of negotiable instruments, if the negotiable document has 
been duly negotiated to the holder, section 9-309 gives him priority 
over an inventory financer.51 
B. Accounts 
If the debtor has sold some of his inventory, an inventory fi-
nancer may be claiming the accounts thereby created as proceeds,52 
while at the same time an accounts financer is claiming the accounts 
as original collateral. Although it will be rare that both an accounts 
financer and an inventory financer are financing the same debtor, 
the situation does occasionally arise and the problems created appear 
to be handled adequately by the Code. 
The filing of a financing statement is necessary for the perfection 
of a security interest in accounts, 53 but since a security interest in 
accounts cannot attach until the accounts come into existence,rs4 the 
accounts financer cannot perfect until the goods are sold and the 
accounts actually arise.55 However, since the perfection in proceeds 
is a continuous one, the inventory financer would be deemed to 
have perfected as to accounts at the time he perfected as to the 
original collateral. 
With this background, assume first that both financers have filed 
as to the original collateral and that their interests are thereby 
perfected. If the inventory financer had filed originally as to both 
inventory and proceeds, then clearly section 9-312(5)(a) applies, and 
the first to file would prevail. However, even if the inventory fi-
nancer had not filed originally as to proceeds, and the two lenders 
are claiming the accounts during the ten-day period after the debtor 
has received the accounts, the inventory financer retains his limited 
perfected status in the accounts as proceeds under section 9-306(3). 
Under Kripke's analysis, discussed above, it can be argued that since 
the proceeds are then automatically perfected, there has been a 
perfection otherwise than by filing, so that the first-to-file rule would 
be inapplicable.66 Applying the alternative first-to-perfect rule, the 
51. See U.C.C. § 7-501. 
52. See note 19 supra. 
53. u.c.c. § 9-302. 
54. u.c.c. § 9-204. 
55. u.c.c. § 9-303(1). 
56. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. N.Y, U.C.C. § 9-312 (Practice Com-
mentary 7) (McKinney 1964); Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved 
Problems, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1529, 1544-45, 1559-62 (1963); Craig, Accounts Receivable 
Financing: Transition From Variety to Uniform Commercial Code, 42 B.U.L. REV. 187, 
201-02 (1962). 
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inventory financer would prevail even if the accounts financer had 
been the first to file, because the inventory financer's perfection 
dates back to the perfection of the original collateral, while the ac-
counts financer's perfection does not occur until the account comes 
into existence. As was noted above,67 however, the fallacy of this 
analysis is that the perfection of the inventory financer's interest 
in proceeds is created othenvise than by filing,08 When the proceeds 
comes into existence, there is no "new" perfection-the inventory 
has merely taken a different form, and in section 9-306(3) the Code 
makes it clear that the original perfection continues as to this new 
form. It follows, then, that if the inventory financer files as to pro-
ceeds within the ten-day grace period, priority sho"Qld still be deter-
mined by the first-to-file rule. Thus, regardless of whether the in-
ventory financer has filed within the ten-day grace period or the con-
flicting claim arises during that period, the first to file as to the 
original collateral would prevail, since in either case the inventory 
financer's perfection as to proceeds would be merely a continuation 
of the original perfection. 
Suppose, however, that the inventory financer perfects his secu-
rity interest in the original collateral othenvise than by filing, such 
as by taking possession of warehouse receipts,69 a situation which 
might occur where the debtor has temporarily stored excess inven-
tory in a warehouse. Under section 9-304(4) and (5) the inventory 
financer can relinquish the warehouse receipts to the debtor and 
still remain perfected for a period of twenty-one days. If the inven-
tory financer files within that period, section 9-312(6) provides that 
for purposes of determining priority the security interest will be 
treated as perfected in the same manner as perfection originally 
occurred. Thus, regardless of whether the inventory financer has 
filed within the twenty-one day period or the inventory covered by 
the receipts is sold during that period, for purposes of determining 
priority he would be treated as if he had perfected by taking posses-
sion. Consequently, as between the inventory financer and the ac-
counts financer, the first-to-perfect rule, rather than the first-to-file 
rule, would apply.60 As a result, even though the accounts financer 
may have filed before the inventory financer perfected, the rights of 
the accounts financer would be inferior to those of the inventory 
financer because of the latter's prior perfection. Yet there is no 
apparent reason for preferring the inventory financer in this situa-
57. See text following note llO supra. 
58. U.C.C. § 9-!112(6) states that for purposes of priority, a continuously perfected 
security interest is treated as perfected in the same way as the perfection originally 
occurred. Thus, if the security interest in the inventory was perfected by filing, then 
the security interest in proceeds during the ten-day period, being a continuously 
perfected one, should also be deemed to be perfected by filing. 
59. See note 25 supra. 
60. u.c.c. § 9-312(5)(b). 
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tion, while giving priority to the accounts financer when he files first 
in a situation where both perfect by filing. In both instances, the 
inventory financer would have notice of the accounts financer's prior 
interest. The accounts financer who had filed first, however, could 
not have notice of the inventory financer's later perfection. For this 
reason the accounts financer is protected from the inventory fi-
nancer who later perfects by filing, and on the same basis he should 
be protected from the inventory financer who later perfects other-
wise than by filing. 
One way to protect the accounts financer from an intervening 
inventory financer who perfects otherwise than by filing would be to 
amend section 9-204 so that a security interest in accounts would 
attach at the time the secured party files. 61 If attachment, and there-
fore perfection, of the security interest in accounts could occur when 
the secured party files, the inventory financer could not prevail by 
perfecting otherwise than by filing after the accounts financer has 
filed. Consequently, if the accounts financer files before the inven-
tory financer perfects (whether by filing or otherwise), the accounts 
financer will prevail and ·will thus have the protection to which he 
is entitled. Such a result would encourage financers to accept ac-
counts as collateral, since they would not have to fear another fi-
nancer coming in at a later date and getting priority. 
The traditional notion that a security interest does not attach 
until the account comes into existence stems from the deceptively 
appealing logic that one cannot give rights in something he does not 
have. Clearly, this notion is meaningful with respect to tangible 
items. For example, assume a debtor borrows $5,000 to buy a partic-
ular boat and the lender attempts to take a security interest in the 
boat to be purchased. Assume further that the debtor does not use 
the money to buy the boat, but instead squanders it and goes bank-
rupt. If the security interest were to attach before the debtor ac-
quired rights in the boat, the result would be absurd: the secured 
party would be able to satisfy the debt by taking the boat from its 
mvner. Additional problems could arise if the debtor takes goods 
which are already subject to previous security interests. For exam-
ple, suppose that after borrowing the $5,000, the debtor buys a 
$7,000 boat subject to an existing $6,000 perfected security interest. 
If the $5,000 security interest were to attach when filed, the holder 
of the $6,000 security interest would be deprived of his collateral 
if he were not the first to file. He is protected, however, by the doc-
trine that a security interest attaches only when the debtor acquires 
61. U.C.C. § 9-204 presently provides in pertinent part: 
(I) A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection (3) 
of Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in 
the collateral. It attaches as soon as all the events in the preceding sentence have 
taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching. 
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rights in the goods; under this rule, the holder of the $5,000 secu-
rity interest can reach only the debtor's interest in the boat, which 
in this case would be $1,000. Finally, if this were not the rule, some 
goods might even come into existence subject to a prior interest. 
Unborn young of livestock. might be subject to an interest claimed 
in the mother.-02 Crops not yet planted, oil, gas, minerals, or uncut 
timber might be claimed by the owner of the land, and fish not yet 
caught by the ovmer of the water.63 
However, intangibles,64 such as accounts and contract rights65 
are not subject to such vicissitudes. Since intangibles are incapable 
of possession and are defined in terms of the debtor, 66 all interests 
in them arise only through that debtor. Filing as to intangibles is 
accomplished according to the debtor and not according to the col-
lateral,67 so that the filing requirements would give sufficient notice 
to a subsequent financer. Conflicting security interests in intangibles 
could thus be resolved by the ordinary priority rules. Unlike the 
boat hypothetical, the only other possible security intere,st which 
could conflict with that of an accounts financer would be the inter-
est of someone claiming the accounts as proceeds from other col-
lateral owned by the debtor. This claimant would be adequately 
put on notice by the filing requirements. Therefore, the reasons 
for not permitting a security interest to attach to tangible goods 
are not applicable to intangibles. 
In situations involving after-acquired accounts, an amendment 
to the Code providing for attachment coincident with filing would 
also avoid a potential conflict between the Code and the Bankruptcy 
Act. Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act permits the trustee in bank-
ruptcy to void a transfer by the bankrupt if such a transfer is "for 
or on account of an antecedent debt," and if a number of other 
conditions are satisfied.68 According to section 60, a transfer occurs 
when the transferee obtains a security interest which has priority 
over the claim of a subsequent lien creditor;69 under the Code, a 
security interest would have such priority only after it is perfected.70 
The Code provides further that a security interest is not perfected 
62. E.g., Dunning v. Croffutt, 81 Conn. IOI, 70 A. 630 (1908); Kellogg v. Lovely, 46 
l\Iich. 131, 8 N.W. 699 (1881). 
63. See, e.g., Fruth v. Charleston Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915). 
64. The term "intangibles" is used here in its common sense, and should not be 
confused with the category "general intangibles" as defined in U.C.C. § 9-106. 
65. The Code's distinction between accounts and contract rights seems unnecessary. 
The only section which distinguishes between the two is U.C.C. § 9-318, and that 
distinction could be handled even if contract rights were included in the definition 
of accounts. 
66. See U.C.C. § 9-106. 
67. See U.C.C. § 9-401. 
68. § 60a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(l) (1964). 
69. § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1964). 
70. Under the U.C.C. a security interest prevails over a lien creditor only after it 
is perfected. U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(b). 
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until it attaches, 71 and it does not attach until the debtor acquires 
rights in the collateral. 72 In the case of an accounts financer, the 
debtor has no rights in the collateral until the account actually 
comes into existence, and thus a transfer occurs only at this point. 
Since there is no consideration given at this time, bankruptcy doc-
trine might deem it to be a transfer for an antecedent debt which 
the trustee in bankruptcy could void,73 but the Code provides that 
this same transfer "shall be deemed to be taken for new value and 
not as security for an antecedent debt."74 The courts have not yet 
resolved this apparent conflict.75 The proposed amendment provid-
ing for attachment at the time of filing would effect a transfer 
simultaneous with the exchange of consideration, and, since such 
a transfer would not be "for or on account of an antecedent debt," 
it would not be considered a voidable preference in bankruptcy. 
C. Purchase Money Security Interests 
Whether a purchase money security interest76 in inventory ex-
tends to proceeds in the form of chattel paper or accounts is un-
clear.77 The pertinent language of section 9-312(3) reads: "A pur-
chase money security interest in inventory collateral has priority 
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral if .... "78 
At least one writer seems to feel that since accounts and chattel 
paper are not the "same collateral" as the inventory, the purchase 
money financer has no priority as to them.79 While the Code is not 
explicit, it would seem logical to interpret the phrase "same col-
71. u.c.c. § 9-303(1). 
72. u.c.c. § 9-204(1). 
73. This conclusion is somewhat uncertain because the Bankruptcy Act fails to 
define antecedent debt. Thus, a court could legitimately borrow such a definition from 
§ 9-108 of the Code, which would resolve the apparent conflict. But see 3 W. CoLLIER, 
BANKRUPTCY § 60.19 (Supp. 1966). 
74. u.c.c. § 9-108. 
75. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 40, at § 45.6. Many other distinguished commen-
tators have found the same conflict to exist. See, e.g., Gordon, The Security Interest 
in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference 
Problem, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 49 (1962): Krause, Kripke & Seligson, The Code and the 
Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U.L. 
REv. 278 (1967); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commer-
dal Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518 
(1960); Riemer, The After-Acquired Property Clause Revisited, 70 CoM. L.J. 334 (1965). 
See also In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967); 
Note, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1004 (1967); cf. Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. 
Mass. 1967). 
76. For a discussion of purchase money security interests in inventory, see 2 
G. GILMORE, supra note 40, at 784-91. 
77. See id. at 791-97; Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priori-
ties Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REv. 838, 861 n.87 
863 (1959). 
'78. Emphasis added. 
79. Coogan, supra note 77. 
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lateral" as including all proceeds of the inventory.80 In the case of 
the non-purchase money financer, proceeds is considered to be the 
same collateral in a different form, and the proceeds of inventory 
subject to a purchase money security interest should be treated in 
the same way. The language of section 9-306, which provides for a 
continuing security interest in proceeds, certainly does not limit its 
application to the non-purchase money situation, nor does section 
9-312(3) indicate that the two sections are mutually exclusive. Fur-
thermore, the concept of a floating lien,81 which seems equally appli-
cable to purchase money financing, supports the notion that the 
purchase money interest in inventory should continue in proceeds. 
As between a non-purchase money inventory financer and a 
purchase money inventory financer both claiming the same pro-
ceeds, the purchase money financer prevails, regardless of the order 
of perfection or filing, if he has satisfied the three requirements of 
section 9-312(3).82 This result is not unreasonable, since one of the 
requirements of section 9-312(3) is that the non-purchase money 
financer be notified of the interest of the purchase money financer. 
Because of the notice requirement, the non-purchase money inven-
tory financer cannot be misled into advancing money in reliance 
upon new inventory which is already subject to a purchase money 
security interest. 
A serious problem arises, however, if the purchase money inven-
tory financer is claiming accounts as proceeds, while an accounts 
financer, who filed before the purchase money financer became a 
secured party, is claiming them as accounts. Section 9-312(3)(b) 
requires the purchase money financer to notify "any secured party 
whose security interest is known to the holder of the purchase 
money security interest or who, prior to the date of the filing made 
by the holder of the purchase money security interest, had filed a 
financing statement covering the same items or type of inven-
tory .... "83 It is significant to note that this section does not speak 
80. See Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commerdal Code, 65 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 232, 240 (1965). 
81. See note 11 supra. 
82. The three requirements are: 
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor 
receives possession of the collateral; and 
(b) any secured party whose security interest is known to the holder of the pur-
chase money security interest or who, prior to the date of the filing made by 
the holder of the purchase money security interest, had filed a financing 
statement covering the same items or type of inventory, has received notifica-
tion of the purchase money security interest before the debtor receives 
possession of the collateral covered by the purchase money security interest; 
and 
(c) such notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to 
acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, 
describing such inventory by item or type. 
83. Emphasis added. An interesting problem as to notice might arise if instead of 
inventory, the purchase money security interest is in farm products, since U.C.C. 
§ 9-312(3) applies only to inventory collateral. 
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in terms of the "same collateral,"84 but instead uses the phrase "same 
items or type of inventory." Thus, the accounts financer could not 
argue that he is entitled to notice because proceeds is the "same 
collateral in different form." As a result, although the purchase 
money financer would have to notify the holder of a previously 
filed non-purchase money security interest in the inventory, pre-
sumably he would not have to notify an accounts financer.815 There 
is no apparent reason, however, for placing the non-purchase money 
inventory financer in a more advantageous position than the ac-
counts financer vis-a-vis the purchase money inventory financer. 
Both the non-purchase money inventory financer and the accounts 
financer have a floating lien and would be advancing money as the 
debtor acquires new security. Yet the non-purchase money financer 
is entitled to a warning that the inventory he is about to accept as 
collateral for a new advancement is subject to a prior interest, while 
the accounts financer, evidently, does not have a right to the same 
warning.86 
It appears that the priority problem created by the conflicting 
security interests of the purchase money inventory financer and the 
accounts financer could be solved by a simple change in section 
9-312(3)(b). That section should be amended to give priority to the 
purchase money financer over all other previously filed secured 
parties who have been notified, 87 assuming, of course, that the other 
requirements of that section have been met. This change, in addi-
tion to protecting the previously filed accounts financer, would also 
establish that the purchase money inventory fi.nancer has a continu-
ously perfected security interest in the proceeds. Since the purchase 
money inventory financer would have to search the records anyway 
for any non-purchase money inventory interest, the added burden 
to him would not be very great. 
Peter A. Dankin 
84. See text accompanying note 80 supra. 
85. But see 2 GILMORE, supra note 40, at 795, for the argument that the accounts 
financer must be notified. 
86. But see Craig, A.ccounts Receivable Financing: Transition From Variety to 
Uniform Commercial Code, 42 B.U.L. REv. 187, 203-04 (1962), for the argument that 
an inventory financer's priority over an accounts financer who filed first is supportable 
as a matter of policy. 
87. See Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon 
Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARv. L. 
REv. 1529, 1568 (1963), for the suggestion that if purchase money interests are to be 
followed into proceeds, the accounts financer should be given notice. 
